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1. David Letterman

Intelligence
David Letterman is baffled and balked by intellec
tion; he is heaped by
Wherever it manifests itself,
is awe-stricken. Like most Americans, he is
unsure where to locate it — Ted
is his idea of
an intellectual1 — but wherever he finds it, he is
unmoored to the point of
Disconcerted, but
freed of his inhibitions by her unwittiness, he bel
lowed at Marilyn vos Savant: "I'm as smart as you!”
David Letterman thinks as quickly as anybody in
America — as fast as William F. Buckley, Jr., in one
field, or Stanley Fish, in another. The conundrum
that he seems to confront every day is how it is pos
sible to think dangerously fast yet possess no ideas at
all. His condition is the intellectual equivalent of pri
apism among mannequins. It seems to make him
furious.
It makes him, also, the best comedian of his time,
since jokes are successful to the extent that they
impose the form of thought
disarray. Therefore
Letterman s jokes are, disproportionately, meta-jokes;
they are about the formal intelligence with only dreck
for substance.

Female Intelligence

What David Letterman is least able to comprehend,
of all
of mind, is a particular
of female
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intelligence, as manifest in such personages as Jane Pauley, Ellen DeGeneres, or
Teri
He told an interviewer that “there is something very appealing about
smart women, intelligent women. And you can see the problem there: if
they’re smart enough for me to be interested, then they’re not going to have
anything to do with me” (Zehne 101).
Letterman is apt to refer to such women as “witty.” By this, I think he intu
its the following. Pure comedy is Euclidean form imposed on debris. Insofar
as the shape of humor is congruent with its material, on the other hand, it is
classified as wit. Of course, neither Pauley nor DeGeneres nor Garr is exactly
an aphorist along the lines of La Rochefoucauld or Wilde. What gives their
humor an unexpected integrity is gender: their femaleness is both the sub
stance and shape of their humor. Letterman cannot fathom this, but he adores
it.

In his purity, in what I wish to call his
purity, Letterman can seem
a
disembodied intelligence. Women on his show may fawn on him, but when
they do, Letterman is often repelled — any Letterman theory would have to
begin with the national
of his encircled, beleaguered, castellated
comic mind. We hear that he watches his weight to the point of
(on
a show he said he was ’2”, 170 lbs.); a study of the jaws of afflicted Americans
would force the conclusion that anorexia is the last wilderness of American
Puritanism, where
nourishes itself on its own negation, where self-abase
ment is the only licit form of self-fashioning, where heroic bleeding is the only
sanctioned form of heroism. On “Good Morning, America,”2 after his Acade
my Awards show failure, Letterman said that you learn by “ingesting the neg
ative,” which is unintentionally a bulimarexic pun (the negative once ingested,
Letterman’s most negative emissions are in jest).
You can conceive of Letterman almost as pure velocity. A really great
comedian has a demented time sense: the world appears to be moving too
slowly for
mind. (For a great comic actor, it
be moving too fast.) To
the extent that time is psychological, a comedian is forced to live in concentric
spheres,
at different rates. The scraping throws off sparks, but it
makes Letterman crazy. The effort to put the two worlds in gear may involve
alcohol or drugs; for Letterman, it entails speeding.
“To annihilate both space and time” was the hype of American Protestant
technological millenarianism. The dream of pure soul — or pure mind — is, at
its most intense, to be everywhere at once. The mode of American apocalypse
proceeded from train to telegraph (the increase in speed was a progressive ani
mation) naturally to TV. TV apocalypse is the American style of abjection.
Car-son

The paradox is that Letterman is the loudest American comedian since Sid
Caesar. He yells an astounding fraction of his jokes, with a leonine roar like the
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start of an engine, as if his first Indiana jokes had to outshout the whole Indi
anapolis 500. He is also oddly physical: he does facial shtick (the skunk eye,
for example); he plays with his suit; he imposes his body even as far as the cam
era.
Yet all the time you feel that there is a mind at the center of all this physi
cal demonstration, driving it like a machine,
a car, trying to call itself into
the world as the car. The great Protestant comedians turn jokes into violent,
swift, efficient, beautiful mechanisms. Johnny Carson was Lettermans prede
cessor in this pursuit, securing a kind of rock-age technical perfectionism from
the jazzy improvisations of his Jewish coequals, Mel Brooks, Buddy Hackett, or
Lenny Bruce. Carsons mind would plant itself within costumes; costumes
would mortify Letterman; but Lettermans suit and his body itself, and
face
itself, are contraptions, like Walt Disney’s automated Presidents on steroids.
Letterman’s height does matter. You feel slightly disoriented and depressed
when his guest is taller than he is. But I read Letterman’s height, as I shall
argue with respect to a peculiar moment in Céline, as pure verticality, a single
ideal dimension.
Lettermania
Almost everyone is willing, in Letterman’s presence, to play at abjection: his
audience grovels in order to be part of the
and sensibility. They submit
to his thinking of them as his “kids.” Yet when you
him in the compa
ny of those he respects — Pauley or DeGeneres or Garr (who, like mothers, are
adored and unattainable by tacit consent) and Carson (among fathers) — you
fantasize a similar familiarity, by which I mean that he could be, with you, sim
ilarly
The Letterman anecdote that
essay on him has to repeat con
cerns the note he passed to Teri Garr before a commercial: “I hate myself.”
With respect to Carson, the abjection is more balanced (you are not supposed to
be the man your father was): “That’s the guy. Maybe I could work at it, but
I’m not the guy.”3
The TV relationship, which the Academy Awards audience resisted, is not
a meeting of
and objects, as at the movies, but an intimacy of abjects.4
David Letterman
our abjection visible — he puts it before the camera —
but visible in a twice-disowned body, once
self-disjunction, twice by the
technologies of fame; and a corollary is that exposure to the dreck of New York
that Letterman loves to dwell on and in leaves us feeling almost absolved. The
“abject,” as Kristeva calls it, is sloughed
snakeskin.

2. Kristeva/Céline/Letterman
Kristevan Abjection
There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of being,
directed against a threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside
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inside, ejected beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. It
lies there, quite close, but cannot be assimilated. It beseeches, worries, and
fascinates desire, which, nevertheless, does not let itself be seduced. Appre
hensive, desire turns aside; sickened, it rejects. A certainty protects it from the
shameful a certainty of which is proud holds on to it. But simultaneous
ly,
the same, that impetus, that spasm, that leap is drawn toward an else
where as tempting as it is condemned. Unflaggingly, like an inescapable
boomerang, a vortex of summons and repulsion places the one haunted by it
literally beside himself. (Kristeva 1)

So begins Kristevas “Essay on Abjection,” and I believe it is, so to speak, empir
ically correct. However you take Kristevas neo-Freudian etiology (“abjection”
is a reminiscence of the condition of the subject, unseparated from the mater
nal body, before it is a subject, the adult
of which is horror of the indis
crete), it is certain that she knows how abjection is
It is experi
enced, first of all, as a
ecstasy — you are “literally” beside yourself; it
be summarized as your failure to know what is inside of what, to find your
own synecdoche, the homunculus that stands for self. This entails a series of
incongruities.
(1) “Abjection,” whose posture ought to be prostrate, is capable of resis
tance, of “revolt,” fact. (2) Revolt leads to resistance (or else the revolt is the
resistance — it is characteristically unclear), which is not to desire, it is ofdesire.
This is understandable enough, except that desire's willfulness and uprightness
seem oddly (for desire) Puritanical. (3) If desire acts like restraint, the object
of abjection — the “abject,” as Kristeva calls it — must resemble, at any rate,
the object of desire;
is summoned by it. Desire is pseudo-conscience
because abjection is pseudo-desire. (4) If desire acts like restraint, it can
a
source of self-pride. But instead of “it [desire] holds on to a certainty of which
it is proud,” we get, “a certainty of which it [desire] is proud holds
to it.”
Desire feels, somehow, as if its power to resist comes from elsewhere; yet the
feeling of self-disenfranchisement must be exactly what, in abjection, desire is
resisting. If abjection is pseudo-desire, desire plays the role of conscience
abjectly.
This flux of
and victimage — such that what is tempting is not desired,
and desire in turn restrains, and desire in turn is proudly held — seems to me
exactly apt as as a social diagnosis of Puritanism (only in the presence of the
abject will desire convert itself into conscience, surviving by self-betrayal). Yet
it is safe to say that Kristeva is not the theorist to appreciate the comic possibil
ities of deriving uprightness from prostration.

Abject Histrionics
The person who is “beset by abjection” (Kristeva 1) puts on, I should think,
y infra-dramas, actor before audience and vice versa. You are, after all, lit
erally beside yourself, watching your faculties — desire, for example — play
unaccustomed roles, always authored by someone else. Kristeva, however, does
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not quite say this. Her abjected subject is caught in a vortex, is haunted; even
its power to resist is merely susceptibility to sickness and repulsion; it is much
more acted upon than active. Nowhere before her culminating section on
Céline does Kristeva focus precisely enough
the histrionic aspect of
tion; and in the Céline passages, I think, she does not contemplate it so much
as just accurately note it, the result being a desideratum for David Letterman
wil
base
base

es.
down
“Abjection” has, in English, an uncollapsible performative dimension. All
of what follows is listed in one dictionary as a single meaning of the term
“abject.” “Sunk to a low condition; cast
in spirit or hope; degraded;
servile; groveling; despicable; as abject posture, fortune, thoughts;
and
abject flatterers.” The oddness is how this meaning silently turns at “servile”;
and how the theatrical dimension of the second example (“abject flatterers”) is
already ambiguously present in the first (“base and abject flatterers”
assume
an “abject posture”); and how the apparent redundancy of adjectives in the sec
ond example (“
and abject”) fudges the question of whether at the root of
abject performance is abject being.
The term “abjection” itself is falsely, therefore appropriately, Latinate and
upright. This would be telling if everyone who was abject was aware that he or
she was “abject” — which may be the case, for all I know. There may be no
abjection without a frustrated definitional literacy. At any rate, all those who
identify themselves as abject, for example Céline,
l feel the telltale self
dramatization of the word. Even if we posit a victim of abjection who is psy
chologically illiterate, nevertheless it
be a symptom of the ego at the edge
of its defenses, scouting for even a counterproductive self-definition, that any
extreme state will be enacted with hostility and lobbed like a grenade to the
back row.

Comic Abjection

Not sufficiently registering the histrionic assertiveness of
is not
ciently featuring, I want to argue, the essentially comic dimension of abjection.
Abjection and Laughter in Kristeva
Laughter ought to have more to do with Kristevas nosography. There are
moments when its exclusion seems almost perverse. Following her initial asso
ciation of the abject with unthinkable permeabilities, Kristeva specifies vague
ly, defines abjectly, that it is a “'something that I
not recognize as a thing.
A weight of meaninglessness, about which there is nothing insignificant, and
which crushes me” (2). If it crushes her, it cannot be taken lightly; yet the pres
ence of significance without meaning seems comic in general, and like David
Letterman's comedy particular. Its symptom is verbal speed: “The speech of
the phobic adult is also characterized by extreme nimbleness. But that vertig
inous skill is as if void of meaning, traveling at top
over an untouched and
untouchable abyss, of which, on
only the affect shows up, giving not
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a sign but a signal” (41). Here the crushing weight of meaninglessness seems
to take the form of levity; surely
Kristeva’s oxymoron we are approaching
laughter: “But with the borderline patient, sense does not emerge out of non
sense, metaphorical or witty though it might be” (50). Not quite there, howev
er. “On the contrary, non-sense runs through signs and sense,
the result
ing manipulation of words is not intellectual play but, without any laughter, a
desperate attempt to hold on to the ultimate obstacles of a pure signfier that has
been abandoned by the paternal metaphor” (50-1).
Occasionally one is sure that, for Kristeva, it is simply the case that laugh
ter palliates the abject condition. Discussing Dostoevsky’s The Possessed, Kris
teva asserts that “Verkhovensky is abject because of his clammy, cunning appeal
to ideals that no longer exist, from the moment when Prohibition (call it God)
is lacking. Stavrogin is perhaps less so, for
immoralism admits of laughter
and refusal” (19). This would appear to set up a disjunction: abjection or
laughter. Yet when Kristeva goes on to describe the modern world, what she
finds is abjection and laughter undivided: “The worlds of illusions, now dead
and buried, have given way to our dreams and deliriums if not to politics or sci
— the religions of modern times. Lacking illusions, lacking shelter,
today’s universe is divided between boredom (increasingly anguished at the
prospect of losing its resources, through depletion)
(when the spark of the
symbolic is maintained and desire to
explodes) abjection and piercing
laughter" (133).
Which is it: or or d? Laughter would seem to be
ambiguity within a
confusion. But there is a way to be more precise about the relationship. When
Kristeva defines sin as “subjectified abjection” (128), you might feel inspired to
refer to laughter as “objectified abjection.”
finds abjection unfunny
when signifiers have been “abandoned by the paternal metaphor,” when “Prohi
bition (call it God) is lacking,” but piercingly funny “when the spark of the
symbolic is maintained,” which
be the difference between enervated and
an electrified absence. Absent objectivity is funny when it “sparks,” perhaps,
because a joke is dreck enflamed by form, that is, by a standard it inhabits but
to which it cannot aspire. Thus it
clear why laughter, disjoined from
abjection generally, attaches to it when
comes to describe modernity:
in our century, apocalyptic yet Godless, abjection is a psychopathology that
happens to
realistic. When you cannot
abjection, according to
Kristeva, as filth or sin (the God of Jews and Christians alike being dead) —
when objectivity lingers in the world only as a
of abjectivity — you
laugh.
This move allows Kristeva to value Céline without embracing him: an
abject person may show a symptom, but in an abject world, a person
be a
symptom.5 But I still do not think that Kristeva — by positing that Céline’s
laughter makes him a symptom of an objectively abjectifying world — has got
ten his humor exactly right. She arrives at the topic at long last in the brief cul
minating section on Céline.

With Céline we are elsewhere. As in
or even prophetic utter
ances, he speaks out on horror. But while the former can be withstood
because of a distance that allows for judging, lamenting, condemning,

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol1/iss1/3

an your
an 

abject
 an
 

6

Limon: Journey to the End of the Night: David Letterman with Kristeva, C

John Limon

11

Céline — who speaks from within — has no threats to utter, no morality to
defend. In the name of what would he do it? So his laughter bursts out,
facing abjection, and always originating at the same source, of which Freud
had caught a
the gushing forth of the unconscious, the repressed,
suppressed pleasure, be it sex or death. (205-6)

Céline is
apocalyptic writer without revelations; his "language of
tion” merely “topples” into “nothing more than the effervescence of passion and
language
call style” (206). The unconscious gushes; the laughter bursts; the
language topples; Céline is overwhelmed. The paradoxical willfulness of abjec
tion drops out: some have degradedness thrust upon them. Yet even Kristeva’s
Céline is capable of knowing that abjection
be histrionic. The two Hendeit.
preserve
mirror.histo the Endprecedes
fact,should
es women
of the Night, which
have been
the
by in Journey
be
name of the David
Letterman show, embody in Kristeva’s phrase “calculated
abjection” (168). It does not gush, burst, or topple: it manipulates and maneu
vers. Abjection may be a recrudescence of the pre-mirror stage, but it practices
before a portable
(Kristeva implies at various points the relation of
abjection to anorexia — food is feces in the abject ethos — but the gagging
nausea she describes is not the anorexic’s willful self-sculpting.)
Céline
What is funny about Journey to the End of the Night?6 Partly its humor resides
in local excesses; but the greater, antithetical joke is Journeys refusal to ascend
or decline: its perfect horizontality. You feel mounting hysteria (under partic
ular circumstances, a condition confusable with hilarity) from the book’s failure
to ascend or decline with you. In the first place, Bardamu seems to
just enough innocence —just enough vulnerability to goodness — to keep hor
ror fresh, from World War I to Africa to New York to Detroit to the insane asy
lum back in France and
own old age. But even the uniformity of that
ment — in which goodness is a blip — is not constant enough. Bardamu’s hor
ror is always ready and prepared; it
existence. Even before the Great
War, a young Bardamu describes God as “sensual” and “grunt[ing] like a pig. A
pig with golden wings, who falls and falls, always belly side up, ready for caress
es, that’s him, our master” (Journey 1983, 4). This God is a bourgeois even
before Bardamu has the experience of impoverished resentment. Bardamu
knows him
inverse empathy, because his own destiny is to fall and fall, belly
side up, ready for abjection.
“You can
a virgin in horror,” Céline or Bardamu notoriously proclaims,
“the same as in sex” (Journey 1983, 9). As a matter of
one is never, in Jour
ney to the End of the Night, a virgin in horror, if that means unacquainted with
I call attention to the possibility that one may be “innocent ... of Horror”
(Marks’s translation \Journey 1934, 9] of “on est puceau
l’Horreur” [Voyage
21]), nonetheless: the point is that something in Céline takes the place of inno
cence, that is, the place before experience. Whatever that something is, it must
have the following skewed characteristics. It must precede experience (so that

Published by eGrove, 1996

7

Journal X, Vol. 1 [1996], No. 1, Art. 3

12

Journal x

the experience of horror is definite); it must figure experience proleptically (so
that Bardamu can recognize horror as the correlative of what horrified him even
before
encountered it in World War I); it must continue during experience
(so that horrors, anticipated and never-ending,
nevertheless stay fresh).7
The trivial American name for that thing is "attitude,” as when Jerry Sein
feld says that David Letterman “has a great attitude.” The humor of attitude is
that it judges all the time but is strictly non-judgmental; it is not, as Kristeva
says, apocalyptic or prophetic, insofar as there is no experience that precedes it
to judge; and when experience does accrue, it is powerless to make a case,
mocked by its own superfluity. The same attitude greets every eventuality. This
is
without meaning, intelligence without ideas: attitude is a way to
be of the world but not in
Starting with attitude means that there is nowhere
for a journey to get. Bardamu arrives at horror immediately, and
the rest
of his journey — undertaken on the assumption that there is an end to the night
— rediscovering it, until the peripatetic immobility abruptly shuts down.
Céline says brilliantly that “one has to be more than somewhat dead in
order to be truly a wisecracker!” (quoted in Kristeva 138). Death is, technical
ly, infinite repetition without intervals, which makes Bardamu’s travels an
approximation of an after-death experience in continuous disgust. What is the
humor of this? How would The Divine Comedy be comedic if there
only
Inferno? Invoking the trite term “attitude” is only meant to call attention to a
quality of Journeys abjection: its chronic inexperience. The novel may be
described as a monologue that occasionally intersects not experience or other
humans but other monologues. When Bardamu, in the first chapter, describes
God as a pig, he is performing at the time his poem on the subject, before the
history that can only justify
And wherever Bardamu's monologue crosses another, there abject histrion
ics cross. The monologue is the privileged technique of attitude: it comes first,
but it confines reality such that nothing else comes second. And attitude is
abjection on a roll, abjection exuberant in its basic exhibitionism. Tania, a
woman whose beloved has just died, is “intent on her tragedy, and still more
intent on exhibiting it to me full flood” (Journey 1983, 315). In this
she resembles the
blinded Robinson, who “groaned under his bandages
as soon as he heard me climbing the stairs” (Journey 1983, 281). It is impor
tant to locate the performativity within abjection, not outside it and compro
mising it. Robinson is in fact abject — recumbent — but
is also perform
ing abjection. “People live from one play to the next,” Bardamu says, always
ready with the aphorism that is his own emblematic performance {Journey
1983, 224). Thus a “tragedy” such as Tanias feeds comedies such as Célines.
When Bardamu arrives at New York, he shares a laugh — unique experi
ence, since most communal laughter in this book is of a piece with horror,
merely smut amid smuttiness — with his fellow voyagers.
Talk of surprises! What we suddenly discovered through the fog was
so amazing that at first we
to believe it, but then, when we were face
to face with it, galley slaves or not, we couldn’t help laughing,
it right
there in front of us. . . .
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Just imagine, that city was standing absolutely erect. New York was a
standing city. Of course we’d seen cities, fine ones too, and magnificent
seaports. But in our part of the world cities lie along the seacoast or on
rivers, they recline on the landscape, awaiting the traveler, while this Amer
ican city had nothing languid about her, she stood there as stiff as a board,
not seductive at all, terrifyingly stiff.
We laughed like fools. You can’t help laughing at a city built straight
up and down like that. But we
only laugh from the neck up, because
of the cold blowing in from the sea through a gray and pink mist, a brisk
sharp wind that attacked our pants and the chinks in that wall, I mean the
city streets, which engulfed the wind-borne clouds. (Journey 1983, 159;
Céline’s ellipsis)

This is a peculiar passage: not only does Bardamu — uncharacteristically
socialized — share a laugh, but the laugh goes on and on; it is a unique moment
of helpless laughter. Nor is it immediately explicable: what is so funny about
skyscrapers?
It is almost an obvious smutty joke. The city is erect in public; it is an urban
exhibitionist. Or say that the joke is trickier than that, because the European
cities that "recline on the landscape, awaiting the traveler” would seem to be
female (though immobile and inorganic as mannequins), making the grammar
of the translation appropriate, even if its biology is not: “she stood there as stiff
as a board, not
at all.” If the woman repossesses the phallus, will this
be perceived as comical? But the joke is only half-funny, only funny “from the
neck up,”
the “sharp” wind “attacked our pants.” Castration is not
funny when it can be felt; it is only funny insofar as the head can be separated,
for the sake of intellectual amusement, from the body that suffers it. This sep
aration, of course, is not merely a retreat to the intellectual; it is a retreat from
castration to the intellectual by means of an
of self-castration. The joke
here would seem to
the proud reenactment of castration in order to escape
I am not quite satisfied with this exegesis,
the European cities that
lie down assume the abject posture, which is a position normally assumed, in
Kristeva and Céline,
men. I
not think that Bardamu is laughing at a
phallic woman so much as at a phallic abjection: the wind attacks both the voy
agers’ pants and the permeability of the wall. This makes the femaleness of
cities into a metaphor of the abjection of the men who inhabit them, enslaved.
So the joke is not the sort of smut that Bardamu scorns; it reveals the point of
that smut.
When Bardamu goes ashore, he walks down Broadway — in three of the
sensible four dimensions he walks by the Ed Sullivan Theater, where David
Letterman performs. On Broadway, the truth of New York reveals itself to
horizontal after all: “That street was like a dismal gash, endless, with us at the
bottom of it, filling it from side to side, advancing from sorrow to sorrow,
toward an end that is never in sight, the end of all the streets
the world”
(Journey 1983, 166). Broadway, for all the castrated disgust of this passage —
are imagined less as castrated than as the blood of an objectified castration
— has the precise, endless automobility of Céline’s novel. The castration, so
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long as it is objective, is still funny. New York is always the land of the joke in
Céline: below ground, where men excrete, they “laughed and joked and cheered
one another on”; “the new arrivals were assailed with a thousand revolting
jokes” Journey 1983, 169). But this is the sort of smutty joking that Bardamu
despises, as opposed to the real humor of the vertical. New York is the inter
section of perpendicular hilarities.
One of the few uses of the term “abject” in Journey (at least according to the
Marks translation) is in the description of blinded, criminal Robinson who “lay
in . . . bed upstairs
an abject state of mind” Journey 1934, 322; “Lui, dans
leur lit de la chambre d’en haut menait pas large” [Voyage 290]). Yet this is only
a page before we are told that Robinson “groaned under his bandages as soon
as he heard me climbing the stairs.” Abjectness is proneness seeking an audi
ence. Whenever there is
there is performance; whenever abjectness
is exposed as exhibition, it is comic. It is comic because it should be prone but
it is upright. “I was a hundred-percent sick,” says Bardamu, “I felt as if I had
no further use for my legs, they just hung over the edge of my bed like unim
portant and rather ridiculous objects” Journey 1983, 148; “commes des choses
négligeables et un peu comiques” [Voyage 158]). What is comic is that the
essence of verticality should make itself visible as the sign of a complete hori
zontal impotence.
Napoleon said that a heroic
would become comic if the orator
down while orating. Céline implies the inverse: the
monologue becomes
comic when it stands up. David Letterman, stranger in New York, caffeinated
when he should
sleepy, vertical when
should be supine, panning New
York from the Empire State Building down, is the stand-up comedian par
excellence. The gestalt of talk show stand-up realizes the implicit added dimen
sion: Letterman is vertical when we are prostrate, but we take his attitude as
our own. All Americans are now funny, not just Jewish comedians and gag
writers straining
weekly material. (The average gag on the worst situation
comedies now is funnier, judged in isolation, than the best gag on, say, The Honeymooners\ and the terrorized look on Groucho’s contestants has faded from the
face of the earth.) This eventuality — the comedification of America — is the
most astounding fact about the American sensibility from 1960 to 1996.
Where Bardamu meets America — in the New York illuminated night, on
Broadway, at the Ed Sullivan Theater — is the stage on which, at the millen
nial end of his century, its abjection erects its last cross.
3. The King of Comedy
What is the fate of abjection in Martin Scorseses scarily intelligent film, The
King of Comedy? It ought to be everywhere in the film, but seems to be
nowhere. The pathetic comedian Rupert Pupkin (Robert DeNiro) should be
abject but is utterly buoyant, directed, and simple in his psychosis. He knows
where to seek the end of his night. Talk show superhost Jerry Langford (Jerry
Lewis) should be symmetrically abject — if I have justified applying the term
to David Letterman — but shows few signs of having any of the requisite
boundaries whose permeability would horrify him. A first approximation of the
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psychocomic situation is that neither has abjection because they have each
other. Rupert Pupkin begins the movie in
exact copy of Jerry Langfords
suit, and Jerry Langford ends the movie staring at multiple images, in multiple
TVs, of Rupert Pupkin. When Rupert looks at Jerry,
sees his own body
thrown off and replaced by image, out of all time and space; when Jerry looks
at Pupkin, he sees at a distance
own rejected body, rejected identity, reject
ed home.
One of the jokes of the movie is that to all appearances Jerry Langford is
the
host of The Tonight Show and Rupert Pupkin the pretend host, yet the
film gives Jerry Lewis the opportunity to pretend to
Johnny Carson (and
along the way gives Tony Randall, playing “himself,” the opportunity to pretend
to be Jerry Langford). What does it mean to conclude that Jerry Lewis is to
Johnny Carson as Rupert Pupkin is to Jerry Langford? It is almost precisely
true to say that what Jerry Lewis gets to pretend to be is Protestant. When I
first saw The King of Comedy, my initial reaction was: but dont they understand
that Jerry Lewis cannot under any circumstances be the Tonight Show host? Its
host must be a pseudo-hick with attitude arriving in New York from the heart
land; he meets Jewishness there, and the chiasmus (stranger host from the
provinces meets native guest from the home city) is the genius of the genre. He
cannot
a Jew himself: one has only a distant memory of the ill-conceived
Joey Bishop Show, whose only upshot was the subsequent
of Joeys second
banana, Regis Philbin.
My second reaction, however, is that the fate ofJerry Langford’s Jewishness
is the fate of his abjection. Not that Jewishness is the royal road to abjection
— rather that Jerry Langford’s own body is treated like pork in his desire for
pure imagery. Jerry is installed, in The King of Comedy, in layers and corridors
of Waspitude (played by Shelley Hack); like the heart of the Pentagon, he is
protected from invasion not locked doors or impregnable walls but rather by
an aseptic
At his network office, or at his penthouse, or at
country
home, Langford’s life is a Nordic iceberg.
But when Pupkin penetrates Langford’s country home, Jewishness reap
pears, though it is entirely unclear where. The Asian butler, Jonno, summons
Langford home from his golf game, exclaiming over the phone, “I’m getting a
heart attack, already.” For the moment, only the Asian is a Jew. Yet when Jerry
arrives on the scene, he manages to be, for perhaps the only moment of the film,
expressively Jewish
Jerry kicks Rupert out of the house; making the
pathetically tardy inference that Jerry (at a previous encounter) had only
feigned kindness, Rupert says, belligerently, “So I made a mistake.” “So did
Hitler,” Jerry counters. This riposte, I believe, could not have been in the script
— it makes too little sense. It has all the
of what passes in Jerry Lewis’s
mind for a witticism: it is cruel, sharp, and fast, it has the form of a joke, but
it has no humor. Does Jerry Lewis (or Jerry Langford) forget at the moment
who is in power? What mistake of Hitler’s is he thinking of? All that is clear
is that something that has been repressed returns: what Jerry Langford expels,
Jerry Lewis ingests. This is a moment of abject reversibility, only possible if
abjection is the sort of rotatable axis I have described. Céline claims to be the
true victim of World War II, and Heller and Roth (and the Jewish comedians
of their generation) enlist themselves as Céline’s truest
7

Published by eGrove, 1996

'

glory

11



his

Journal X, Vol. 1 [1996], No. 1, Art. 3

16

Journal x

Meanwhile, Rupert (along with his accomplice, Masha, played by Sandra
Bernhard) resolutely distances himself from all the New York nobodies and cra
zies with whom he manifestly has everything common. As opposed to Jerry,
who in this film is
anywhere in particular, Rupert is always
His comedy routine returns compulsively to his place of origin, Clifton, New
Jersey; so does Rupert, who still lives in his mothers house. But Rupert has an
insight: in the world of the media, other people may carry your body for you,
golf clubs.
What Rupert does to Jerry is give him a body and a place. In Rupert's aura,
Jerry’s body turns out to be bizarrely locatable, his world bizarrely pregnable. In
Rupert, at long last, Jerry must ruminate on what he has ejected. Rupert and
Masha capture Jerry, sit him down, mummify
body; for
night he is in
one home, not every home. When Jerry is ensconced in tape, the film cuts to
the network office where Rupert’s blackmail offer (in return for Jerry’s body, he
is to be allowed to appear on The Jerry Langford Show) is being discussed: “Sup
pose we tape him,” somebody says, meaning, “suppose we agree to videotape the
with Rupert before committing ourselves to broadcasting it.” The pun is
really an anti-pun: tape locates Jerry in
chair and one body but displaces
Rupert from his image. When the tape is, in fact, aired, Rupert stands proud
ly beside his own face; Jerry is looking at many identical images in a department
store window; then Rupert’s face begins to multiply across hundreds of copies
of Life, Newsweek, Rolling Stone, and People, Mechanical reproduction is
squared idealism: a machine is intelligence without content, insofar as it dis
embodies and dislocates on behalf of no value.
In fame America, you can lose your body (in images), your voice (when
Jerry Langford phones the office and says that he is being held hostage, it is
assumed that
impressionist is staging a gag), and your name (the movie
begins with a distribution of autographs, some of them pseudonyms). Here is
the logic of abjection taken to its grandest joke: at the end of the night, when
are on the verge of sleep, when our bodies seem so massive that sleeping
itself seems an unfair burden, David Letterman conspires with Jerry Langford
to stand up for velocity and lightness of being — all intelligence, no meaning.
The dream is of a world that makes a joke of class, ethnicity, origins — of all
situations. The American joke, 1960-1996 — which should not be thought
lessly dismissed as a joke — is that, faced with the alienation of body, voice, and
name, we perform

Notes
1. The Family
audience was asked in the
1980s to “name an
intellectual.” The winners of the poll were Henry Kissinger, William Buckley,
Joyce Brothers, and the host of the show, Richard Dawson, himself.
2.
May 11,1995.
3. I am not sure how everyone is in possession of the first anecdote; for the
remark about Carson, see Schruers 32.
4. From Frankfurt to Birmingham, TV criticism has increasingly propped
up its object, the TV audience. First proclaimed to be absorbed and catatonic,
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then peripatetic and distracted, the TV audience is now conceived of as inter
active and contumacious. For variations on the Birmingham view see Hall et
al.; Fiske and Hartley; and Press. The point of my own essay is to explain how
the TV audience as well as the TV star can be symmetrically and simultane
ously absorbed, peripatetic, and interactive.
5. For Céline as symptom in Kristeva, see Hill.
6. Louis-Ferdinand Céline, Voyage au Bout de la Nuit, references to this edi
tion, abbreviated Voyage, will be inserted parenthetically the text. All trans
lations, unless otherwise stated, are from the Manheim translation; references
to this edition, abbreviated Journey 1983, will
inserted parenthetically in the
text. Occasional reference is made to Marks’s translation; references to this edi
tion, abbreviated Journey 1934,
be inserted parenthetically the text.
7. See the special issue of South Atlantic Quarterly entitled “Céline, USA.”
One of the recurring themes is the pervasive Jewishness of Céline's American
audience; the phenomenon is first remarked
Dickstein, who notes the influ
ence of Céline
Heller, Roth, and the sick comedians.
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